April 5 1925
Sir James Craig’s feelings today must be curiously akin to those of Mr Stanley Baldwin on the morning of December 8 1923.
Mr Baldwin, like Sir James, had a comfortable, indeed overwhelming, majority in his House of Commons. He could have “carried” on without any trouble for several years. But he became impatient. Many prominent British Conservatives were outside his Cabinet and counsels; the Die-hards were pestering him: so he suddenly decided to dissolve the British Parliament and hazard everything on the results of a General Election on an issue chosen by himself: it was Protection.
The elections were held on December 6; by December 8 Mr Baldwin realised that he had failed – that his Parliamentary majority had vanished – that he could not hope to govern Great Britain with a free hand any longer. Circumstances favoured him thereafter: but that is British history.
Sir James Craig’s majority in his own little Parliament was even more secure than Mr Baldwin’s in London; in fact, the Parliament consisted of nothing but a majority. In a moment of irritation, accepting advice which proved fatal and rejecting the exhortations of more prudent and experienced counsellors, he, too, “rushed” a General Election and raised a “War-cry” that had become as hackneyed as “Protection”; he wanted to intimidate Justice [Richard] Feetham, Dr [Eoin] MacNeill and Mr [Joseph] R Fisher: and he called on the public to vote for him on “The Boundary”.
We shall not discuss the Boundary business at this stage. Sir James Craig’s failure is, in effect, more ignominious than Mr Stanley Baldwin’s was in December 1923.
The British Prime Minister had to face the opposition of two highly organised and well-equipped political Parties, one young and virile, the other old and bearing a reputation established during the conflicts of 200 years.
The Northern Prime Minister challenged opposition in a small territory within which those most thoroughly opposed to his policies had little more than the shadows of political organisations at their backs.
Nationalists, constituting about 40 per cent of the population, were divided, lethargic, unorganised: six years of Dissension and Do-Nothingness had disheartened a majority amongst them. Partial opposition was to be expected from a few “interests”; outside Belfast Labour was not be reckoned with; in Belfast it had been curiously ineffective. Sir James Craig and his Cabinet not merely looked for an easy and decisive victory: they anticipated a “walk over” to all intents.
Irish News editorial commenting on the foolishness of James Craig calling an election when there was no need. In the second election to the Northern parliament on April 3 1925, the Ulster Unionist Party lost 8 seats, going from 40 to 32 seats.
