Speaking to the Irish News’ political correspondent John Manley, before his speech at the West Belfast Festival last week, Jeremy Corbyn criticised his successor Keir Starmer for saying he would campaign for Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom in the event of a border poll. The core of Corbyn’s criticism, over and above the fact that he has long supported a united Ireland, is his view that Starmer has misread/misinterpreted the Good Friday Agreement, which “calls on the prime minister to be neutral, to stay out of it.”
Actually, it doesn’t say that at all. The GFA says ‘…it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without external impediment, to exercise the right of self-determination on the basis of consent freely and concurrently given…’ Nowhere in either the GFA or the NI Act 1998 is there a clause, sentence or provision which prevents the UK and Irish governments from making the case, for want of a better description, for their constitutional preference.
In fairness to him it isn’t just the UK side he wants to exclude from the debate: “The GFA says the governments of Ireland and Britain have to stay out of the debate and be neutral in it all and I think it’s very important that both governments feet be held to the fire on that. It’s got to be the people of Ireland that make that decision.” Fine and dandy you might think, until you read another comment to Manley, in which he says the Irish government “needs to be proactive in preparing the ground for unity.” But surely preparing the ground for unity suggests that unity is the outcome you want. So how could an Irish government be both neutral and preparing the ground for its desired outcome?
I think there is a belief in some nationalist quarters that the phrase ‘external impediment’ applies solely to a UK government; on the basis, I presume, that the British side is regarded as an outsider. But again, there is nothing in either the Agreement or the Act that, to quote an academic expert on the subject, “determines the UK government’s constitutional position nor the assertion of that position.” In other words, when Keir Starmer said he would campaign for the constitutional status quo because, “I believe in the United Kingdom”, he is committing no breach of the terms, conditions, understanding or interpretation of the Agreement and Act.
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All that is required from both governments is the confirmation—which has been given—that, irrespective of the outcome of a border poll, they will abide by the outcome. There isn’t, in fact, any requirement for either government to take a side (they could both decide to sit it out and leave it to the electorate to make the call); yet it would be extraordinary if rigid impartiality was an option for either of them. Frankly, I would be astonished if, during a border poll, the Irish government didn’t support constitutional change while the UK government endorsed the constitutional status quo.
The one thing that would shake up the dynamics, though, is the point at which both governments (and it would have to be both) published the specific conditions under which a border poll could be called. The GFA is a bit vague—surprise, surprise—merely noting that the Secretary of State would ‘exercise the power (to provide a referendum) if at any time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.’
But how is ‘likely’ defined? Does it fall into the possible, probable, maybe category, or does it have to wait until all of the electoral, polling and assorted research evidence points to the indisputable fact that the united Ireland camp is bigger than the rest of the constitutional/electoral communities? Obviously, it suits Sinn Fein to have a border poll as soon as possible, because even if it doesn’t produce a victory for unity it does, at least, trigger a process at which there has to be another poll seven years later. Mind you, I’m not persuaded that even the seven years hint is a set-in-stone feature of the GFA.
Corbyn is well aware that the present vagueness helps the pro-union side, which is why he also told Manley that a future Labour Secretary of State (who he hopes will materialise within the next 16 months or so) should “spell out” the criteria for a border poll. To be honest, I can’t imagine Starmer signing up for that commitment this side of the general election, not least because he might need support from the DUP. I don’t think we are in a 1992 position—in which the seemingly helpless John Major plucked an electoral rabbit out of the hat—but Starmer is more Kinnock than Blair and nowhere close to being able to bank a comfortable victory.
But it does seem likely that the Conservatives will lose to Labour fairly soon. So, it makes sense for unionism to push open a few doors and try, if possible, to build some sort of relationship with Starmer and his key players. The very fact that he has said he would back NI in a border poll is, I think, of significance; and certainly, significant enough to gently test his bona fides.
