There was an interesting piece by Ross Wilson in Tuesday’s Irish News: 'So... just who are the constitutional agnostics?' The story was on the back of opinion research commissioned by The Irish News-University of Liverpool-Institute of Irish Studies about what might persuade ‘constitutional agnostics’ (reckoned to represent around 13 per cent of potential voters) to take a position in a border poll.
According to the research 36 per cent said they would vote for a united Ireland, while 51 per cent said they wouldn’t if a border poll were called tomorrow. Which makes the 13 per cent don’t knows/wouldn’t vote crucial to the eventual outcome. Hence the research into what would encourage that 13 per cent to pick and then vote for a side.
Actually, I would be interested in research into why the 36 per cent and 51 per cent have already made up their mind; and whether they could be persuaded to switch sides during the border poll debate.
Having a fixed position this far ahead of a border poll suggests their sense of constitutional identity — how they view themselves, in other words — trumps everything else. For example, if an ardent Irish nationalist, determined to vote for a united Ireland right now, discovered there would be a significant financial hit, would it make a difference when it came to voting?
Or if an ardent unionist discovered she would be better off in a united Ireland would she vote for it? And what about those unionists who valued their membership of the EU and want it restored: would that be enough to make them vote for a united Ireland?
Here's another question worthy of research: what would persuade soft nationalists to support the constitutional status quo? I can understand those who view ‘Ulster’ unionism as anathema but would a broad political/constitutional vehicle promoting a pan-UK identity hold appeal to them?
In the last decade or so — indeed it might stretch back to the early 1970s — there has been a shift of former unionist voters to Alliance: and most of the evidence seems to suggest that while pro-Union they are uncomfortable with electoral unionism in its present form.
I suppose what I’m asking is whether there is room for a new political vehicle in Northern Ireland? Not one that positions itself between unionism and nationalism while determined to remain agnostic on the constitutional debate, but one that promotes pan-UK unionism and the benefits of UK membership. One that will focus on the UK rather than just on this one smallish part of it.
Anyway, back to Wilson’s piece. It seems that symbolic and cultural issues don’t matter all that much to the agnostics, because only 16 per cent of them would be persuaded to vote for a united Ireland if there were a new flag and national anthem. Similarly, only 38 per cent of them could be persuaded by amendments to the Irish constitution to protect religious and national minorities, or by a power-sharing system of government in Dublin.
I’m not sure those figures do indicate a lack of interest in symbolic and cultural issues. Isn’t it more likely they might fear that flags, anthems, constitutional changes and power-sharing (I assume this means mandatory rather than voluntary) would simply replicate the problems which have dogged NI politics for decades?
Which leads to an issue which, from what I’ve read in the piece, wasn’t raised in the research questions. Would a specific and clearly outlined accommodation of political/electoral unionism help to persuade agnostics from a unionist background to support a united Ireland? That could be an important, maybe even swing, consideration for those unionists who voted Remain in 2016 and want to reclaim that piece of their identity. A decade ago they would probably have voted to stay in a UK which was also in the EU: but maybe they would consider a united Ireland in the EU if they also knew that key parts of their unionist identity would be both acknowledged and accommodated.
House prices, pension and benefit provision, health services, education, investment in transport, public transport and infrastructure et al will come under pressure whether we live in the UK or a united Ireland. Every government has to make tough decisions in all of those areas. A united Ireland cannot be sold as some sort of utopia in which there won’t be pressures, cuts, inflation and tax rises. The removal of the present border won’t, necessarily, resolve those issues. Indeed, some present difficulties on both sides of the border might be exacerbated if two became one.
Or, putting that another way, the united Ireland lobby cannot simply ‘buy’ votes on border poll day. They can’t buy them because they can’t guarantee long-term, let alone permanent, resolution to the sort of problems you see everywhere else. And nor can you magic away the concerns of the hundreds of thousands of unionists who might find themselves on the losing side of the poll. Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland wasn’t extinguished in 1921 and ‘Ulster’ unionism won’t be extinguished if it loses in a border poll in 10 or 20 years’ time.
There is a lot to think about in Wilson’s piece, not least of which is how unionists counter the findings of the research. It certainly seems to be the case that a significant section of the agnostics are persuadable; and it may also be the case that some unionists presently on the pro-UK side of the debate could be persuaded by full membership of the EU. So political/electoral unionism needs to be countering the arguments in favour of a united Ireland with its own arguments — costed, coherent, thought-through, attractive and inclusive — in favour of the status quo.
One thing it mustn’t do is dismiss the poll and carry on regardless.
