GIVING evidence to the NI Affairs Committee on October 18, Dr Aaron Edwards (one of the sharpest observers of loyalist paramilitarism) made two important observations:
“The political dimension has lessened since the ceasefires in 1994, however since the Brexit referendum and subsequent protest actions on the streets we have seen new life breathed into these old antiquated paramilitary structures”;
“For those who have been around for quite a long time and have lived with paramilitarism all their lives and still continue to see paramilitaries with some kind of standing or stature in their communities, I think there’s a shaking of heads and all I can really see the strategy doing at the moment is mowing the grass… essentially, occasionally there are weeds that need pulled out by the roots, but fundamentally the grass continues to grow and we’re continuing to see paramilitary structures continue to re-energise and rejuvenate. There are more loyalist paramilitaries today than there were 30 years ago.”
Why is that? Ironically, I think it’s because loyalism/unionism has more fear of British governments than it does of Irish governments, the IRA or nationalism.
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They, after all, do precisely what is expected of them: pursue Irish unity, albeit by different methods and strategies. Unionists/loyalists expect British governments to underpin their status as citizens of the UK, particularly when – as evidence continues to suggest – a majority in NI wishes to remain within the UK.
Loyalist paramilitaries tend not to have a lot of faith in the local unionist establishment, either. The ‘modern’ UVF has its roots in a statement issued on May 21 1966, in which it declared war against the IRA and its splinter groups. But at the time there wasn’t what could be described as a sustained IRA campaign.
Indeed, the 1956-62 ‘border campaign’ had ended with a petulant ceasefire announcement in which the IRA appeared to blame its failure on the "...attitude of the general public whose minds have been deliberately distracted from the supreme issue facing the Irish people..."
The UVF seemed more concerned with the emergence of what we would now understand as O’Neillism; a form of unionism which recognised the need for reform and progress and reaching across the traditional political/societal/constitutional barriers.
Ian Paisley was also flexing his campaigning and propaganda muscle at much the same time, focusing on ecumenism and the weakness of ‘big house’ unionism.
The 1973/74 assembly would not, I think, have collapsed without the input and on-the-street activities by the UVF and a new generation of loyalist paramilitaries, especially the UDA and RHC. But neither they, nor political/electoral unionism, had a what-do-we-do-now alternative once Faulkner and the executive resigned.
And even when that generation of loyalism announced its October 1994 ceasefire and later supported the Good Friday Agreement, it was hedged with conditions; the most important of which was that the constitutional position would not be undermined.
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In November 2019 I interviewed two loyalists who had played a key role in rowing loyalism in behind David Trimble and the GFA. They were angry about the proposed NI protocol and mentioned the anger that was seeping down into a new generation: “It is about the Union now and a change to the Union that makes us different – puts us into an economic united Ireland. And people on the streets are anything but happy and we’re trying to calm them down. There are cool heads, but there are also people who want a different path.”
That new generation is now better organised than it was four years ago. Not, perhaps, radicalised enough to take up arms, but certainly radicalised enough to support rallies, protests, campaigns and electoral tactics to kill-off the protocol/framework, even if it means killing off the assembly in the process.
I don’t think they’re actually huge in number but, like in 1966, 1974 and other moments, they clearly still have an impact on the thinking and strategy of mainstream unionism.
