Opinion

Alex Kane: Instinct tells me border poll is coming

Alex Kane

Alex Kane

Alex Kane is an Irish News columnist and political commentator and a former director of communications for the Ulster Unionist Party.

Secretary of State Chris Heaton-Harris has the power to call a border poll
Secretary of State Chris Heaton-Harris has the power to call a border poll Secretary of State Chris Heaton-Harris has the power to call a border poll

As soon as the ink had dried on the Good Friday Agreement it was inevitable that Sinn Féin, the SDLP and other elements of political and electoral nationalism/republicanism would focus on the requirements for a border poll (details of which were fairly sketchy in the text).

It didn’t mean a relentless, permanent focussing on the issue; rather, a watching brief, during which the narrowing gap between the nationalist and unionist blocs would become the primary yardstick for gauging the chances of success if a poll were called.

But with unionism having lost its overall majority in the 2017 assembly election; the growth of the middle ground after the Brexit referendum (which would change the dynamics of a border poll); the DUP losing its lead party status in last May’s assembly election; and nationalism now a bigger electoral bloc than unionism, it was certain that nationalism would be weighing up a torrent of evidence and wondering if its day was coming.

Another certainty is that the pressure on a UK government to set out the terms and conditions for a poll will grow.

What, political/electoral nationalism is asking, does it have to do to reach the point at which a Secretary of State (who has the call, obviously after consultation with both governments) might conclude that a victory for Irish unity is, in the words of the GFA, ‘likely’? What hurdles have to be cleared?

Opinion polls. Election results. Party rankings. The size of the big two blocs. The number of non-unionist MPs, MLAs and councillors. Census figures. Birth rates. Age demographics within the big two blocs. The number of GAA pitches in unionist areas.

At the moment we don’t know what evidence or statistics the Secretary of State would take into consideration when it came to making a decision. The GFA says nothing on the issue, other than the confirmation that a vote for unity would be facilitated by both governments.

All of which means that the pro-union and pro-Irish unity lobbies are lobbing their competing (often contradictory) facts, figures, soi-disant evidence, polls and inevitabilities with astonishing, almost reckless abandon. The sort of thing which happens when two sides aren’t engaging with each other, so aim mostly at their own side.

Ian Paisley, for instance, argues that “…nationalism is nowhere near, republicanism is nowhere near a significant enough bulk where they can seriously think any government would say ‘now is the time to hold such a border poll'. So, I think we have to keep that in perspective.”

Hmm. This is from a man who took the words of Theresa May and Boris Johnson on faith and who treated the Conservative benches to a finger-wagging whinge after the NI Protocol had been passed. He has no more idea than the rest of us on what a UK government would do. He was kept in the dark from 2017-2023, so I can’t imagine that any light will be shed on the timing of a border poll.

Meanwhile, Mary Lou McDonald admonished the government on Sunday for “flatly refusing to share with us what they believe would be the moment that a referendum might be triggered. On the back now of two very, very significant elections I would urge them to do so”.

But like Paisley, she doesn’t actually have a clue what this government or its successor will do. One advantage she does have, though, is that she may be either taoiseach or tánaiste in the next Irish government and able to put more direct pressure on Downing Street.

I can understand the government’s reluctance: it stems back to the original negotiations in the run-up to the GFA. The minute you put in print the terms and conditions under which a poll could be called, you also put in place an agenda and timeline by which unionism and nationalism will be steered.

The British and Irish will have discussed the issue already and will, almost certainly, have reached a fairly broad consensus on the terms and conditions. Even though the call lies with the Secretary of State (which he would make from the front bench in the House of Commons), it will not be made without the imprimatur of the Irish government. So, I would be astonished if they haven’t already agreed the parameters.

The leaders and key players within unionism know this, of course. They know, too, that the British side will not consult with them beforehand: instead, doing what it has done during a long line of key moments since 1972 –bouncing it on them as a fait accompli.

That’s why Ian Paisley introduced his Referendums (Supermajority) Bill in parliament last November. It’s why some unionists say any referendum should be a UK-wide one rather than just NI. It’s also why some favour the end of devolution, believing, I think, that undermining the GFA somehow torpedoes the likelihood of a border poll.

My gut instinct – and it has served me well over the years – is that a border poll is more likely than not within the next 15 years or so (and probably earlier): and that’s because I believe that the terms and conditions for its calling will be set out within the next 3-5 years (and again, maybe earlier).

Both governments have learned a lot from the Brexit referendum and will not want those mistakes repeated. I think they have accepted the poll is inevitable and will, consequently, prefer the long run-in approach rather than a hectic bounce-in.

The only thing that might change this narrative and present likelihood is solid, irrefutable electoral and polling evidence of unionism regaining ground, seats, votes and confidence.

Maybe that’s what it needs to focus on, rather than simply dismissing the arguments of nationalism and imagining that any UK government would ride to its rescue on the basis of the present evidence.