Opinion

Newton Emerson: The executive veto is simply about raw power

Newton Emerson

Newton Emerson

Newton Emerson writes a twice-weekly column for The Irish News and is a regular commentator on current affairs on radio and television.

The Deputy First Minister Michelle O'Neill described as "disgraceful" the DUP's use of a cross-community veto to block an extension of measures backed by other parties.
The Deputy First Minister Michelle O'Neill described as "disgraceful" the DUP's use of a cross-community veto to block an extension of measures backed by other parties. The Deputy First Minister Michelle O'Neill described as "disgraceful" the DUP's use of a cross-community veto to block an extension of measures backed by other parties.

Why would Michelle O’Neill describe the executive’s cross-community veto as “designed to protect minorities”? Why does she “absolutely fully support” the mechanism itself, just not the DUP’s use of it on a public health issue?

The veto was created by the 2006 St Andrews agreement at the insistence of the DUP to prevent Sinn Féin ministers going on ‘solo runs’, such as Martin McGuinness’s abolition of the 11-plus. It has nothing to do with protecting minorities - it was aimed at blocking minority opinion on the executive.

It can also block majority opinion, as the DUP is demonstrating, but that is a feature of the mechanism, not a bug. Any three ministers can trigger it by declaring any decision to be “significant or controversial”. Although a cross-community vote is then required, no inter-community dispute is necessary. It was last used in June by the SDLP to call for a Brexit extension.

Exempting public health from the veto is not as cut and dried a case as claimed. Nobody disputes that lives are at stake on both sides of the lockdown argument.

The assembly’s equivalent of the veto, the petition of concern, was used during the three-year welfare reform crisis, with both sides portraying their positions as matters of life and death.

As with the petition, the veto depends heavily on politicians showing restraint to avoid bringing it into disrepute. Writing down clear rules of when it should or should not be used would be extremely difficult and plans to do so are invariably resisted.

The DUP and Sinn Féin promised rules for the petition in the 2015 Fresh Start agreement, then never mentioned it again. Similar silence has followed January’s New Decade, New Approach deal. In reality, you either have a mechanism like this or you do not.

A revealing incident occurred this summer when the DUP and Sinn Féin leaderships agreed behind closed doors to slightly weaken the St Andrews rules. Neither properly explained their reasons, including to their own representatives in the DUP’s case, causing the largest backbench revolt in the party’s history.

In other words, the veto is simply about raw power. Any ‘reform’ of it from the inside will be through whatever private understandings the big two reach, which is why Sinn Fein supports a mechanism designed to be used against it: it might want to use it against the DUP.

There are several reasons why the veto has remained the petition’s barely-noticed little brother, until now.

During the welfare reform crisis the three smaller parties began entering opposition until only the DUP and Sinn Féin were left, so the scenario of one executive party being outvoted by many others did not arise. The big two have insisted everyone rejoin them since Stormont’s restoration in January.

Sinn Féin and the DUP have preferred to block each other in the assembly through petitions of concern, as this very publicly drags in the UUP and SDLP for political cover.

That option is unavailable for coronavirus because regulations have to be enacted faster than the assembly can debate them. By using the executive veto instead, the DUP has highlighted the veto and petition’s similarities and that it would be pointless to reform one without the other.

During the three-year collapse of Stormont the petition came to be seen as a key obstacle to resolving deadlocked issues. Then the Alliance surge made it appear hopelessly outdated, as only unionists and nationalists count in cross-community votes.

These objections apply equally to the executive veto, if not more so. At least the petition was part of the Good Friday Agreement, included “to ensure that all sections of the community can participate and work together”.

The executive was left without vetoes to drive consensus towards the centre. A great irony of St Andrews is that unionism finally abolished majority rule.

Unionism and nationalism are now in apparently permanent minorities, with Alliance third in the polls and the next assembly election at most 18 months away. Vetoes look increasingly untenable, yet this further motivates Sinn Féin and the DUP to defend them, as the alternative is Alliance holding the balance of power forever.

Perhaps the best hope for reform is the same approach that delivered same-sex marriage and abortion: a campaign appealing to Westminster, where the power to change Stormont’s rules lies.

Sinn Féin and the DUP are at a combined 47 per cent in the polls. If that is reflected in the next election, what democratic veto against lifting vetoes would they have?