Opinion

Newton Emerson: Inevitable Tory betrayal makes DUP look trapped and impotent

Theresa May and DUP leader Arlene Foster
Theresa May and DUP leader Arlene Foster Theresa May and DUP leader Arlene Foster

ONE day after the 2017 Westminster election and three weeks before the DUP-Conservative deal was signed, Sinn Féin president Gerry Adams called a press conference on the Falls Road to warn, or more accurately gloat, that "alliances between Ulster unionism and British unionism have always ended in tears".

As the DUP sheds tears over a regulatory sea border, republicans and nationalists have been quoting the familiar words of Sir Edward Carson, on what a fool he felt he was for letting himself be used to keep the Tories in power.

What should really sting the DUP about this jibe, as with Adams's gloat, is that taking those warnings from history seriously was the whole premise of its Westminster confidence and supply agreement.

Arlene Foster's party was not going to suffer the pathetic, provincial delusions of 'big house' unionism and allow itself to be patronised and bamboozled by Westminster baubles.

Instead, the DUP would realise the limitations of its influence and the contempt in which it was held, let that lull the Conservatives into a false sense of complacency, then demand a coldly calibrated mix of money with menaces.

Until recently the unionists were credited with extracting a brilliant deal, yet now the inevitable moment of Tory betrayal has arrived the DUP appears to have had no influence over a Brexit outcome it has portrayed as a break-up of the union, and to have no leverage against it beyond incredible threats to wreck its own deal or depose the prime minister.

The party looks so trapped and impotent that UUP MEP Jim Nicholson, a unionist of the big house tradition, can ask "what exactly have the DUP been doing all these months?"

It is a little early for a final verdict on the confidence and supply agreement - there is plenty more brinkmanship to go - but it is certainly time to ask if the DUP really got a good deal and made the most of it.

Last December, it emerged the DUP had been offered coalition and a cabinet post during post-election talks, with deputy leader Nigel Dodds becoming international trade secretary.

The offer was reportedly made in desperation and quickly withdrawn but the DUP might have secured something like it if it had wanted to go down that route.

The UUP in its heyday can be easily imagined revelling in a seat at the establishment's table but the DUP decided this was a trap - it would be stuck inside the government, obliged to support it on everything and bound by collective cabinet responsibility, all for the sake of one minister everyone else could ignore.

There would be far more leverage, the DUP calculated, in providing a minority government with limited support from the sidelines - and because of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act the Tories would be trapped in this dependency for five years.

All of this was impressive in theory but the DUP made a tactical error in the implementation - it agreed to support all the government's Brexit legislation, although that was the issue on which it was most clearly going to be betrayed and where it most needed to maintain leverage.

Not being in cabinet meant it did not have to be kept informed on Brexit negotiations, let alone consulted, while failing to support the government on this issue would void the confidence and supply agreement - an option with a high cost to the DUP.

To really play hard-ball within its limitations, the DUP should have offered to support the government on almost everything except Brexit, giving it a ready threat to hang over the entire span of negotiations, rather than a last-minute threat to shoot itself and everyone else in the foot.

However, the whole concept of 'threat', implicit in any confidence and supply deal, forces negativity and invites perceptions of being deservedly betrayed.

Standing on the sidelines, all the DUP could ever do was say "no" to agreements as they were reached, until this approach very publicly ran out of road.

The DUP should have taken its understanding of its limitations further - it was never going to dictate to London and Brussels, in or out of office.

It could have seized the unprecedented opportunity of last year's election to take that seat in cabinet and claim positive ownership of the inevitable compromise - taking credit for 'special status', for example, an SDLP concept that Sinn Féin owns now, despite initially opposing it.

But of course, that is not the DUP's style.

newton@irishnews.com