In two very particular senses Arlene Foster is correct when she says--although it did come across as a throwaway line rather than a thought-through opinion--that the Good Friday Agreement isn't 'sacrosanct.'
It was constructed and promoted as a work of 'constructive ambiguity'; meaning that people could take from it whatever they wished to take from it. David Trimble said it shored-up the Union. Sinn Féin regarded it as a transition stage towards eventual unity. The DUP dismissed it as the 'ultimate betrayal of unionism.' And Tony Blair--not wishing to upset anyone--nodded his head at whatever interpretation he was asked about.
The agreement also made provision for a border poll: vaguely worded and dependent on the evidence that a future secretary of state would require in deciding if a win for Irish unity was 'likely.' In the last five elections in Northern Ireland 'unionists' (those parties and candidates using the terms pro-Union or unionist in their election literature) have fallen just short of the 50 per cent threshold. Recent opinion polls--although there have been differences in the level of support recorded for Irish unity--have indicated pro-Union support hovering around 50 per cent. The 2017 assembly election saw unionists lose their overall majority for the first time ever. So, if Karen Bradley (go on, Google the name if you've never heard of her) was asked today if it was 'likely' that a border poll would deliver Irish unity, she clearly has enough evidence to suggest that 'likely' couldn't be ruled out.
Anyway, in the event of Irish unity I'm not at all clear what role there would be for the Good Friday Agreement. Unless it was agreed to keep an Assembly if Northern Ireland was no longer in the United Kingdom then the cornerstone elements of the agreement would disappear, along with a specific role for and accommodation of those who identified themselves as 'unionist.' So the notion that the agreement is somehow sacrosanct, permanent and untouchable is a palpable nonsense. Even without the fallout from Brexit it is obvious that the agreement needs huge reform; not least because it is hanging on by a thread.
I noted in a previous column for the Irish News that it was increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Good Friday Agreement was 'dead in the water.' Its fate was always going to depend on a willingness of a majority of both unionists and nationalists to implement it in good faith and with common purpose; but it became apparent fairly quickly that that wasn't going to happen. And when the DUP and Sinn Féin cut their own self-sustaining, self-serving deal in 2007 they did so at the expense of the integrity of the Good Friday Agreement.
Mary Lou McDonald noted on Tuesday: "Arlene Foster left the UUP which supported the Good Friday Agreement to join the anti-agreement DUP. It appears the DUP leader has learnt nothing over the past 15 years." Actually, what the DUP learnt was that being very lukewarm about the agreement did them no harm at all at the ballot box. The UUP has continued its slide, with over half of its 1998 vote drifting off to the DUP. A smaller section has also drifted to the even more anti-agreement TUV. And we now know, from Martin McGuinness's resignation letter in January 2017, that Sinn Féin had long been aware of the DUP's disinterest in the agreement: a disinterest that didn't prevent Sinn Féin remaining in government with them between May 2007 and December 2016.
History moves on. Circumstances change. And existing agreements either accommodate those changes or get replaced by new agreements. If there remains a desire for unionists and nationalists to work together in a post-Brexit Northern Ireland (and let's not forget that Northern Ireland remains in the UK until a border poll decides otherwise) then some tinkering with the agreement will be required. That was mentioned during the referendum campaign, so shouldn't come as a shock to anyone.
But if, post-Brexit, nationalism shifts its priority to Irish unity rather than the existing political/electoral institutions in Northern Ireland, then there won't, in fact, be any need for the Good Friday Agreement. It's also worth mentioning that if there was a 'bespoke' arrangement for Northern Ireland remaining in both the UK and in the EU (through the single market and customs union, which is, I think, very unlikely) then there would still have to be some tinkering with the agreement. I'm pretty sure SF and the SDLP would be ok with that. I can't imagine there'd be anyone from either party grandstanding on the sacrosanctity of the agreement at that point.
One thing I've learned about local politics. Nothing is sacrosanct. Nothing is set in stone. Anything, everything, can be changed.
