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KEY POINTS: Catalogue of failures paints a picture of collusion and cover up

Relatives and victims of the Loughinisland Massacre look on as a statement is read out by Niall Murphy, their legal representative to the waiting media about the evidence of collusion between police and Loyalist Paramilitaries. Picture Matt Bohill.
Relatives and victims of the Loughinisland Massacre look on as a statement is read out by Niall Murphy, their legal representative to the waiting media about the evidence of collusion between police and Loyalist Paramilitaries. Picture Matt Bohill. Relatives and victims of the Loughinisland Massacre look on as a statement is read out by Niall Murphy, their legal representative to the waiting media about the evidence of collusion between police and Loyalist Paramilitaries. Picture Matt Bohill.

** Information on a small, but ruthless unit of the UVF was not passed down to detectives by special branch. The ombudsman said some officers "placed more value on gathering information and protecting their sources than on the prevention and detection of crime".

** The V258 assault rifle used in the Loughinisland massacre was part of a consignment brought into Northern Ireland in 1988. This shipment of arms was partly directed by UDA informant (Tommy 'Tucker' Lyttle) alongside members of Ulster Resistance, the UVF and military agent Brian Nelson.

** Intelligence services lost track of the weapons for up to 90 minutes after their arrival. This intelligence gap allowed a large portion of the UVF's share of the weapons to be moved on.The Ulster Resistance weapons were under the control of an individual named in the report as 'Person D' described as intricately involved in the arms shipment. Person D believed to be Noel Little, who was later charged in connection with arms offences in 1989.

** A large amount of the UVF's weapons were stored at the farmhouse at Markethill belonging to former RUC reservist James Mitchell, convicted of storing weapons in 1980. His farmhouse was never searched and no explanation could be given as to why. A police office told the ombudsman had he been aware the farmhouse would have been "taken apart".

** The ombudsman has linked the shipment of weapons to 70 murders.

** The assault rifle used in Loughinisland was previously used in the murder of Joseph Reynolds in east Belfast on October, 1993 and to the attack on McCabe’s butcher’s shop in Cromac Street in the city on March, 1994. The Joseph Reynolds murder was believed to be carried out by the East Belfast UVF, whilst the gun attack on McCabes butchers is alleged to have been carried out as part of a joint UVF East Belfast- Mid Ulster brigade operation. The car used in the murder of Mr Reynolds was supplied by a special branch informer.

** There were significant delays in questioning suspects in the Loughinisland attack and when they were questioned they had been tipped of by an RUC officer that their arrest was imminent. This officer was never questioned about passing on information to loyalists.

** The car used in the attack was stored in a yard and not protected from the elements to preserve evidence. It was crushed less than a year later and is therefore no longer available for forensic testing.

** Police intelligence linked a suspect 'person AA' directly to the attack within days. Despite his house being searched in July 1994 he was not arrested until August 1999. There was no explanation for the delay in the arrest.

** A suspect in the attack was an RUC informant at the time. Special Branch continued to engage with him and other informants likely to have been involved at some level.