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Brexit: Will a united Ireland remain simply a 'low intensity aspiration'?

Talk of Irish reunification has been rife since Britain voted to leave the EU but does the Republic see it as inevitable or even more likely than previously? Donnacha Ó Beacháin, author of a new book on Brexit and Ireland, offers his insight

Former taoiseach and Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern and Donnacha Ó Beacháin at the recent launch of Dr Ó Beacháin's book From Brexit To Partition
Former taoiseach and Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern and Donnacha Ó Beacháin at the recent launch of Dr Ó Beacháin's book From Brexit To Partition Former taoiseach and Fianna Fáil leader Bertie Ahern and Donnacha Ó Beacháin at the recent launch of Dr Ó Beacháin's book From Brexit To Partition

WHILE a substantial majority of the Republic’s electorate has consistently favoured a united Ireland, it has been for most people, most of the time, considered a long-term objective – a low-intensity aspiration that had little relevance for day-to-day life.

In this sense, attachment to a united Ireland has resembled affection for the Irish language, which has also remained consistently high despite the unwillingness of the population to use it. Statements favouring a united Ireland, or the restoration of Irish, have been as much a reflection of national identity as an indicator of daily action or political priorities.

Genuflections affirming their importance became standard fare over the years, traditionally obliging little remedial action and, unlike unfulfilled promises to increase employment and salaries, costing little in terms of votes.

The Irish government’s composition remained remarkably stable for most of the 20th century, with Fianna Fáil predominating for eight decades and a Fine Gael-led coalition, which always included Labour, usually constituting the only alternative. The revolutionary generation was extraordinary, not only for its longevity but also for its dynastic successions, all the more peculiar for being effected by a political elite that had cast off British rule for a republic.

Following the 1923 election, for example, William Cosgrave headed the government, assisted by Minister for External Affairs Desmond FitzGerald and Attorney-General John A Costello. Fifty years later, following the 1973 election, Liam Cosgrave, son of William, became taoiseach and was flanked by Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald, son of Desmond, and Attorney-General Declan Costello, son of John A.

Their political challenges remained much the same as their fathers’ a half-century earlier; both administrations had to contend with a state under siege and the north in turmoil.

Before the Troubles, pressure on the government to ‘do something’ peaked in the late 1940s, following Westminster’s retaliatory passing of the Ireland Act, and again in the mid-1950s during the initial phase of the IRA’s border campaign. Highlighting the inequity of partition was one thing, providing realistic strategies to combat it quite another. As the Irish ambassador to Britain reflected in 1951: "Partition was so wrong morally that it was hard for people in Ireland to think of it as a political problem which had to be approached tactically."

Attempts by northern nationalist MPs to secure access to the Oireachtas – either in the form of actual representation or a mere right of audience – were consistently rebuffed by successive Irish governments. Party leaderships also rejected suggestions they extend their organisations to Northern Ireland, a topic that has remerged in recent times.

During critical periods, however, political parties – particularly Fianna Fáil – diverted popular emotion away from militant agitation by providing an outlet where spontaneous outrage could be harnessed and given a political platform. Moreover, as ordinary activists were more committed on core policy issues than the wider public, party leaders frequently used Northern Ireland as an issue to animate the grassroots.

Fluctuations in popular sentiment occasionally dictated Dublin’s reactions to particular events. In 1969 and 1972, public opinion compelled the government to embark on international tours, including half-hearted initiatives at the United Nations, to highlight the injustices associated with unionist misrule and British army atrocities.

Demands for action, however imprecise or ill-defined, occurred when there was a vacuum in Anglo-Irish relations and no effective mechanism for communicating and addressing Dublin’s concerns. Once an Anglo-Irish inter-governmental process became entrenched, ‘leaving it to the government’ became a viable option for citizens who might otherwise have been inclined towards protest.

In recent decades, opinion polls have confirmed popular sentiment for a united Ireland but these are very much influenced by the wording of the questions asked and the political environment in which the propositions are put. For example, support for unification has tended to be far less solid when linked to the proposition that additional taxes might be necessary to fund it.

The complexities involved, combined with an appreciation that the electorate’s approach to the issue is fragmented, have given Irish governments considerable leeway when it comes to negotiating agreements with the British. Voters have consistently demonstrated that they are willing to accept solutions that fall far short of unity if persuaded that they guarantee peace, and do not explicitly exclude unity as a possible eventual outcome.

Brexit has now polarised relations by fuelling debates about identity and sovereignty that common EU membership had de-emphasised over the years. Many believe it makes a border poll more likely. It has certainly reframed and transformed the significance of Northern Ireland’s constitutional choice.

:: Dr Donnacha Ó Beacháin is associate professor of politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. His book From Brexit To Partition: The Irish Government and Northern Ireland is published by Manchester University Press and is available now.